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Mondale Seeking to Exploit Issue of War

Focuses on Public Anxiety With Help of Broad Range of Advisers

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Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Fear of war, according to most opinion polls, is second only to unemployment as a voter concern this year. And Walter F. Mondale has sought to capitalize on public anxiety—to exploit the “war and peace” issue, as he calls it—with the help of a broad variety of foreign and defense advisers drawn largely from the Administration of former President Jimmy Carter.

Thanks in part to the efforts of some of those advisers, he met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko a day before President Reagan saw the Kremlin's top diplomat. Thanks in part to those same advisers, he has been emphasizing his own commitment to a strong U.S. defense.

Mondale's closest foreign policy expert is David L. Aaron, who was Carter's deputy national security adviser while Mondale served as Carter's vice president. Aaron in turn draws on the views of many part-time advisers chosen from among a group of political figures and specialists who make up Mondale's national security “brain-trust.”

These advisers not only offer counsel on campaign strategy. They sometimes bolster the campaign effort by attacking Reagan directly. And, if Mondale is elected, they could take over the top national security jobs in his Administration.

They include former Defense Secretary Harold Brown; former Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher; former Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency chief James R. Schlesinger; Rep. Michael D. Barnes (D-Md.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Western Hemisphere affairs, and more than a score of others.

Notably absent from the list is Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's chief national security adviser, who was the most hawkish member of the Carter team and who dis-

Mondale in his memoirs. And, at the other end of the ideological spectrum, former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who has been called the leading dove of the Carter Administration, is rarely consulted.

Aaron, who was on Mondale's Senate staff in the mid-1970s, served as an intermediary in setting up Mondale's session with Gromyko. He said that, on Sept. 12, the same day that Reagan announced his forthcoming meeting with the Soviet foreign minister, he got word from a “Soviet academician” that Gromyko would also be willing to talk with Mondale.

Aaron said Mondale discussed the matter with his immediate staff and spoke by phone with several of his advisers, including Christopher, now a Los Angeles lawyer, before authorizing Aaron to determine if the overture was real.

Aaron quickly made contact with the top Soviet diplomat then in Washington, who confirmed within a day or two that “they were willing if we were willing, a kind of dance of the cranes,” Aaron said.

The resulting Mondale-Gromyko session partly diluted the political value to Reagan of his first session with a top Soviet official and gave more credibility to Mondale's complaint that the Reagan-Gromyko meeting produced no tangible easing of tension.

Aaron himself told a university audience last week that Reagan's session with the Soviet diplomat was “a zero.” Although Aaron maintained that he was not speaking for the Mondale campaign, he said that “nothing really bold was put on the table,” implying that a Mondale Administration would have better seized upon the Gromyko visit to advance peace.

Although Mondale is clearly less hawkish than Reagan on Soviet relations, he has also sought to broaden his appeal to independents and conservative Democrats. For example:

—He is calling for an annual increase of 3% to 4% in defense spending, after inflation—a goal that would leave defense spending not far short of Reagan's projected growth of 7.5%.

—He belatedly endorsed last year's Grenada invasion after initially criticizing it; he and Aaron credited Barnes with this new position.

—He acknowledged that “American security interests” are involved in conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua and said he would be prepared to “quarantine” Nicaragua if necessary to stop that nation from aiding leftist rebels in El Salvador.

—He accepted the principle of retaliation against terrorist acts by saying he would support any “ap-

propriate countermeasures” that Reagan might take against the latest U.S. Embassy bombing in Lebanon.

—He invited and then publicized the attendance of Schlesinger, a moderate Republican, and Max Kampelman, a conservative Democrat, at a secret national security briefing for Mondale by Reagan national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane.

Kampelman, a Washington lawyer active in Jewish community affairs, led the U.S. delegation in both the Carter and Reagan administrations to the last international conference to follow up on the Helsinki agreements of 1975. He, like Christopher, has been mentioned as a possible secretary of state if Mondale wins in November.

Schlesinger held Cabinet posts in the Administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford as well as Carter and, Aaron said, is the man Mondale looks to most for advice on intelligence matters.

But, however much he may call on these advisers, Mondale, a veteran of 12 years in the Senate and four as vice president, is well-versed on most of today's major national security issues and established a lengthy public record that follows him into the campaign.

Schlesinger may be his main intelligence adviser, for example, but Mondale was a key member of the Senate Intelligence Committee—and Aaron was his top staff member for intelligence affairs—

during its exposure of CIA and other intelligence excesses.

As a result, Aaron said, Mondale calls on his counselors largely for their reaction to new developments in their field and for comment on his planned new overtures. Aaron himself is almost always at hand for immediate help and advice.

Mondale's running mate, Geraldine A. Ferraro, receives the same kind of full-time advice from Barry Carter, a Washington lawyer who worked with Aaron both on the national security council staff under Henry A. Kissinger and later on the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Earlier this month, for example, Carter was called on to help Ferraro after she confused two arcane concepts of nuclear war: "first strike," or surprise attack; and "first use," or a nuclear response to a Soviet conventional attack on Europe.

In addition to former Pentagon chief Brown, Aaron said, Mondale counts among his defense advisers William Perry, a California investment banker and engineer and former undersecretary of defense for research and engineering; and Robert W. Komer, Russell Murray II and R. James Woolsey, also former high Defense Department officials in the Carter Administration.

On military affairs, he calls on David Jones, retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and retired Air Force Gen. Benjamin O. Davis, former chief of the Strategic Air Command.

Not all of these men agree with all of Mondale's positions. For example, Brown and others support the MX missile, which the Carter Administration proposed but which Mondale wants to kill.

In arms control, key advisers are Walter B. Slocombe, a Washington

lawyer who was director of the Pentagon's SALT II task force in the Carter Administration, and McGeorge Bundy, the top national security official in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, who has advocated no "first use" of nuclear weapons in Europe.

On Soviet affairs, Mondale values the views of Arnold Horelick, director of the RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior and former CIA national intelligence officer for the Soviet Union in the Carter Administration.

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CORD MEYER

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Sen. Baker to the rescue

Congressional oversight of intelligence full of leaks

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Rising above partisanship in this election year, Howard H. Baker Jr., the retiring Senate majority leader, dared last week to tell his surprised colleagues that the emperor wears no clothes.

For the first time, a responsible leader of the Congress has admitted publicly that the elaborate machinery designed to ensure congressional oversight of American intelligence operations is not working.

Established in the wake of Watergate as watchdogs of the public interest, the separate Senate and House Intelligence Committees were supposed to prevent any abuse of secret power by the CIA or other intelligence agencies. Initially,

both committees acted in a bipartisan way to fulfill their essential oversight functions.

But, testifying before a committee on Senate reorganization, Sen. Baker now has said out loud what many think. Warning that "We have a real problem on our hands with the intelligence committees," the Senate leader charges the two committees have become so overstuffed and so insecure that they ought to be abolished and replaced by a single joint committee modeled on the old Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

There is a strong case for this kind of radical surgery to make congressional oversight responsible. In the last two years, the growing partisan divisions over U.S. policy toward Central America have so polarized the intelligence committees that a series of destructive leaks to the press

appear to have come from within their ranks.

The damage done to U.S. interests and allies by these unauthorized revelations is hard to measure, but it is very substantial. The Pakistan government, for example, has been subjected to harsh pressure from the Soviets as the result of a congressional

increased American aid to the Afghan guerrillas. Then there is the hidden damage that accumulates from the hardening resolve of friends and allies not to give the U.S. access to secrets they hope to protect.

Mr. Baker only politely hints at the extent of the problem when he refers in his testimony to "leaks and press accounts of matters that are sensitive enough to warrant greater discretion." A White House official put it more directly when he described the briefing of the committees on sensitive matters as "a theater of the absurd." A top intelligence officer bitterly remarked, "Every time we go up to the Hill there are leaks. We are running a government of anarchy."

There is no single sovereign cure for this compromise of intelligence secrets in the corridors of the Capitol, but Mr. Baker's proposed solution comes as close as possible to reconciling the need for congressional oversight with the necessity for better security. Former intelligence chiefs Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, and Bobby Inman all agree that a stripped-down joint committee with a much-reduced staff provides the only practical way of rebuilding disciplined, bipartisan oversight.

The first obvious advantage of a single joint committee is that it improves security by cutting drastically the combined membership of senators and representatives and the total number of staffers. In fact, Mr. Baker calls for only eight members at most but insists they be chosen from the ablest people in both parties and be required to give overriding priority to their work on the joint committee.

Intelligence professionals are pleased with the prospect of being able to deal with a single disci-

plined committee instead of having to give repetitive testimony to two groups and they look forward to having a single responsible focal point to deal with in times of crisis. Moreover, once assured of the security of the new arrangements, the intelligence chiefs will be able to be more forthcoming in their briefings, rather than being inhibited by constant fear of leaks, as they are now.

However desirable and necessary this reform in the structure of congressional oversight may be, it is not going to be easy to accomplish. The existing organization has a bureaucratic momentum of its own, and staffers will not welcome a merger that will cost many of them their jobs.

But Rep. Henry J. Hyde, R-Ill., who serves on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has taken the lead in drafting detailed legislation to follow up on Mr. Baker's proposal, in the hope of building enough support to ensure favorable action when the new Congress convenes next January. Already two Democrats on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Sam Nunn, D-Ga., have indicated a favorable interest, and a reluctant House Democratic leadership may be willing to go along after the election.

The time has come for a single joint committee on intelligence because there seems to be no better way of reconciling security with accountability in a dangerous world.

Cord Meyer is a nationally syndicated columnist.

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FILE 0

Philip Geyelin 'Cries for Help'

The more you think about it, the quicker you come around to the conclusion that the real threat to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf cannot be resolved by force of arms. It can be resolved, in the end, only by a negotiated resolution of the overriding conflict between Iran and Iraq. If that's accepted, the true magnitude of the current crisis becomes apparent. Nobody among the experts I've talked and listened to can say precisely what combination of diplomatic and economic pressures—what intricate dealings through which intermediaries—would be required to bring Iraq and Iran to a sensible settlement. But any number of authorities will tell you what could happen if the effort isn't made and the Iraq-Iran war continues.

At the very least, there will be more Iraqi and Iranian assaults on the oil lifeline. The Iraqis presumably are trying to weaken the Iranian economy and thus rob Iran of the wherewithal and the will to fight on. The Iranians want to achieve the same effect by punishing the Gulf states that bankroll Iraq's war effort. At current levels, these slices at the oil lifeline are more in the nature of demonstration shots. Much heavier chops, aimed at the oil fields and other facilities, would be needed to produce a genuine oil and energy crisis worldwide. But that would raise high risks of wider world involvement—for both sides, Iraq and Iran.

Hence the widely held theory that, almost certainly in the case of Iraq, but quite possibly in the case of Iran, what we are hearing in these Gulf tanker explosions are what the psychiatrists would call "cries for help." (With

the emotionally disturbed, these cries can also take a seemingly senseless, violent form.) The ayatollah, to some, is crazy like a fox, and to others just crazy. But some experts insist there are forces in Iran that want to end the war. Casualty estimates run up to 600,000, in less than four years. The ayatollah has sworn he will accept nothing less than the end of the government of President Saddam Hussein in Iraq. But most experts doubt he can achieve that objective any time soon.

Iraq, on the other hand, not only has little chance of winning the war but is in no position to withstand a drawn-out war of attrition. In artillery, aircraft and tanks, Iraq has a decided edge—probably enough to stand off even a massive Iranian "final assault." But Iraq is not well fixed for a war of attrition, with a population of 14 million against Iran's 40 million.

There lies the U.S. dilemma. A stalemate invites further "cries for help" in the form of disruption of the Persian Gulf oil lifeline. Worse, the United States cannot win if either side loses. If Khomeini brings down the Iraqi government and carries his Islamic revolution to the Persian Gulf, the danger will be far greater to U.S. interests than the great Soviet menace that the Reagan administration keeps talking about. Former CIA director James Schlesinger would have us consider "whether the fall of Iraq is intolerable." But another former CIA director, Richard Helms, says that if Khomeini's revolutionary regime collapses, the Soviets "could be on the Strait of Hormuz, bing, just like that."

Those alternatives ought to be reason enough for intense diplomatic initiatives by the United States, through whatever middlemen, even while mustering allies and local friends to deal with the fallout of the Iraqi-Iranian war in the Persian Gulf.

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The USIA Blacklist

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As part of what some senators contend is the politicization of the USIA, Reagan administration appointees have banned from a USIA overseas speakers program Americans thought to disagree with the policies or the philosophy of the administration. USIA officials kept a blacklist of people who had been rejected for the American Participants (speakers) Program. Following is a copy of the list with biographical information where available:

Abramovitz, Morton — Former U.S. ambassador to Thailand, presently American ambassador to Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Europe.

Agee, Philip — Former CIA agent who turned against the agency. This name was put on the list as a joke by USIA staffers who disapproved of having a blacklist. Agee was never under consideration for USIA speakers' program.

Albright, Madeline — Served on National Security Council staff as congressional liaison officer during Carter administration. She served on the staff of Edmund Muskie when he was in the Senate.

Baldwin, James — Author of "Notes of a Native Son," "Another Country," "Nobody Knows My Name" and other books.

Bender, Jerry — Professor of international relations at USC. A critic of Reagan administration policy in Southern Africa.

Bialer, Seweryn — Polish-born professor of Soviet studies at Columbia. He is the author of "Stalin's Successors," "Stalin and the Generals" and numerous other works.

Blacker, Coit Dennis — Research associate on arms control at Stanford. An expert on the Soviet military.

Bosworth, Barry — Economist at the Brookings Institution. Served during the Carter administration on Council of Wage and Price Stability.

Bradlee, Benjamin — Executive editor of the Washington Post.

Bremont, Marshall Mrs. — Wife of the U.S. ambassador to Iceland. Author, under the pen-name Pamela Sanders, of "Miranda," a novel that shocked some in official circles.

Brinkley, David — The TV journalist.

Brooks, Jack — Democratic congressman, chairman of House Government Committee on Government Operations.

Bundy, McGeorge — President Kennedy's national security adviser, former president of the Ford Foundation.

Burger, Clair — Former Republican congressman from California.

Burton, Phil — The late Democratic congressman from San Francisco.

Caleo, David P. — Teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Author of "The West and the Western Alliance."

Cerrell, Joseph — Member of the Califor-

nia Democratic State Central Committee. Served as Hubert Humphrey's campaign manager in California.

Chisholm, Shirley — Former Democratic congresswoman.

Chutkow, Paul —

Coffey, Joseph — Professor at the University of Pittsburgh, where he is the director of the Center for International Security Studies. West Point graduate who reached rank of colonel in the Army. Writes on arms control and security.

Cooper, Richard — Harvard economist, undersecretary of State for economic affairs in the Carter administration.

Cronkite, Walter — Yes, Walter Cronkite.

Cummings, Robert J. — Director of African Studies at Howard University.

Davis, James —

de Borchgrave, Arnaud — Former *Newsweek* correspondent, author of "Spike," a political novel that raises the question of Soviet influence in the American press.

Diamond, Sigmund — Baltimore-born, Hopkins-educated history professor at Columbia. Author of "The Reputation of the American Businessman."

Dillon, Dorothy — Director of the Washington Center for Latin American Studies. Formerly at the State Department and USIA, where she was an assistant director.

Dinerstein, Herbert S. — Soviet affairs expert at SAIS, author of "The Making of a Missile Crisis: October, 1962."

Dominquez, Jorge — Cuban-born political scientist at Harvard, author of "Cuba: Order and Revolution."

Downey, Thomas — Democratic congressman from New York.

Drew, Elizabeth — Washington correspondent for the *New Yorker*.

Eldersveld, Samuel J. — University of Michigan political scientist, a specialist on political parties.

Etzione, Amatai — Professor of sociology at George Washington. He has just published a book on corruption in government.

Fagen, Richard R. — Political scientist at Stanford, specialist on Cuba and Latin America.

Fallows, James — Former Carter speechwriter, now an editor at *Atlantic Monthly*.

Feinberg, Richard — Served in the State Department during the Carter administration, a Latin America expert.

Feith, Douglas — Special assistant to Richard Perle, the hawkish assistant secretary of Defense.

Fitzgerald, Frances — Author of "Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam" and "America Revised."

Friedan, Betty — The feminist author of "The Feminine Mystique."

Gailbraith, John K. — The Harvard economist.

Continued